University of Miami Law School

Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review

2-1-1976

The Oceans
V. Nageswara Rao
G. A. Messick
B. P, Kuehne

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Recommended Citation
V. Nageswara Rao; G. A. Messick; and B. P, Kuehne, The Oceans, 8 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 187 (1976)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol8/iss1/10

This Report is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami InterAmerican Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

THE OCEANS

V. NAGESWARA RAO*
GUY A. MESSICK) "
BENEDICT P. KUEHNE)

LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE
As the nations of the world prepare for the next Law of the Sea Conference scheduled for March, 1976 in New York, the following significant
developments are noted.
United States
(1) In a speech to the American Bar Association Convention in
Montreal, August 1975, the U.S. Secretary of State stressed the importance the United States places on the forthcoming Law of the Sea Conference. Dr. Kissinger perceived three major issues. The first is the extent of the territorial sea and the related issue of guaranteed free passage
through straits. The Secretary recognized an approaching consensus on
a 12-mile territorial sea and said the United States is prepared to accept
this formula so long as free passage through straits is guaranteed. The
requirement of free passage has been a consistent and unnegotiable position of the United States throughout the negotiations.
The second major issue perceived by the Secretary is the degree of
control that a coastal state can exercise in an offshore economic zone
beyond its territorial sea. The United States supports a 200-mile economic
zone concept as long as the zone remains high seas for all non-economic
purposes. Dr. Kissinger noted that thirty percent of the oceans would be
under state control if full sovereignty over 200 miles were asserted by all
coastal states. In the situation where the continental margin exceeds
200 miles, the Secretary would seek coastal state jurisdiction over the re*Reader in Law, Osmania University, India; currently Research Scholar, Nehru

University, New Delhi; Fulbright Scholar, School of Law, University of Miami.
**J. D. Candidates, University of Miami.
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sources to a precisely defined limit and require the coastal state to share
a percentage of the financial benefits with the international community.
In an indirect plea to the Congress, Dr. Kissinger pointed out that
unilateral action by Congress to extend exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to
200 miles would be very harmful to the U.S. negotiating position as well
as probably initiating unilateral claims by other countries. The U.S. negotiating position would be harmed in two ways. First, the U.S. would
have lost its major bargaining "carrot". The U.S. views free passage in
straits as critical and is willing to agree to a 200-mile economic zone
as a solution to the problems which are cited by other countries to justify
their 200-mile territorial sea claims. If the Congress undercuts the Administration and unilaterally invokes a 200-mile economic zone, the
Administration has lost a major ingredient in its "package deal".
Secondly, the U.S. negotiating position would 'be harmed by bringing
into question U.S. credibility. The United States has long denounced unilateral claims of such magnitude as contrary to international law, and has
consistently argued that only a widely accepted international agreement
of a uniform set of standards can give these far-reaching claims legitimacy under international law.
Dr. Kissinger quoted Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau as
sharing the present attitude of the U.S. Administration. Mr. Trudeau
said:
Canadians at large should realize that we have very large
stakes indeed in the Law of the Sea Conference and we would be
fools to give up those stakes by action that would be purely a
temporary, paper success.
The Secretary sees unilateral action as a measure of last resort.
The remaining major issue, Dr. Kissinger noted, concerns the international system for the exploitation of the deep seabeds. Modern technology is beginning to have the capability to exploit the resources of the
deep seabeds. The Secretary indicated the United States will not accept
a new international seabed commission which has sole rights to exploit
the seabeds, nor does it desire a race to carve out exclusive domains.
Dr. Kissinger offered a proposal for an international system for the
exploitation of the deep seabeds. The proposal envisions an international
organization which would set rules for deep seabed mining but would
not have the power to control price or production rates. Individual rights
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to exploit the deep seabeds would be guaranteed as would fair and impartial adjudication of conflicting interests and security of investments.
Countries and their enterprises mining deep seabed resources would pay
an agreed portion of their revenues to the international organization, to
be used for the benefit of developing countries. The management of the
organization and its voting procedures would be weighed to reflect the
level of contribution of the participating states. A balanced commission
of consumers, seabed producers, and land-based producers would monitor
the possible adverse effects of deep seabed mining on the economies of those
developing countries which are substantially dependent on the export of
minerals also produced from the deep seabeds. The United States is prepared to explore ways of sharing deep seabed technology with other nations and sees the organization as a vehicle for cooperation.
Dr. Kissinger expressed the hope that international agreement would
come about before the United States undertook exploitation projects but
warned it cannot "indefinitely sacrifice its own interest in developing an
assured supply of critical resources to an indefinitely prolonged negotiation." The responsibility for prompt agreement, he noted, is on all nations.
The Secretary stated four other issues found to be important to the
U.S. These issues are:
-Ways must be found to encourage marine scientific research for
the benefit of all mankind while safeguarding the legitimate interests
of coastal states in their economic zones.
- Steps must be taken to protect the oceans from pollution. Uniform
international controls on pollution from ships must be established and
universal respect for environmental standards for continental shelf
and deep seabed exploitation -must prevail.
---

Access to the sea for landlocked countries must be assured.

must be provisions for compulsory and impartial third-There
party settlement of disputes. The United States cannot accept unilateral
interpretation of a treaty of such scope by individual states or by an
international seabed organization.
(2) Two bills have been introduced simultaneously in the Senate and
the House of Representatives, seeking to extend the offshore fishery jurisdiction of the United States to a limit of 200 nautical miles. Both
bills were motivated by a deep concern for protecting the fishery resources
off the U.S. coast from predatory fishing by modern foreign fishing
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vessels. Thus, while the bill introduced in the House of Representatives
(H.R. 200--- "Maritime Fisheries Conservation Act" of 1975) stated that
"stocks of fish which United States fishermen depend upon have been the
target of concentrated foreign fishing which has increased dramatically
during the past decade," the Senate bill (S. 961 - "Fisheries Management
and Conservation Act") spoke of "increased fishing pressure" and consequent overfishing and depletion. The bills have substantially similar
objectives and seek to establish a 200-mile fishery conservation and management zone extending from the outer limits of the territorial sea but
measured from the base-lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
was measured. The provisions of both bills apply to all species of fish
except the "highly migratory species," the management of which shall be
done in accordance with international fisheries agreements entered into
for that purpose. In the case of anadromous fish, however, both bills
provide for exclusive U.S. management of those fish throughout their
migratory range from fresh and estuarine waters of the U.S. to the high
seas. The bills also include the continental shelf fishery resources within
the fishery management plan.
However, S. 961 and H.R. 200 differ in certain respects.
(a)

Termination:

S. 961 clearly states that its provisions "shall expire and
cease to be of any legal effect" on the entering into force of any law of
the sea treaty to which the U.S.A. is a party or such other "comprehensive"
treaty (Sec. 104). Thus, S. 961 is in fact what it says it is- an emergency
interim measure. Though H.R. 200 also declares that it is of interim
nature, it does not contain any automatic expiration clause in the event of
a multilateral treaty coming into effect. On the other hand, the bill envisages its own continuance. H.R. 200 merely provides that the Secretary
of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State "may promulgate
• . . such changes, if any, in the regulations issued pursuant to this Act
as may be necessary or desirable to conform such regulations with the
provisions of such Convention . . ." (Sec. 205, emphasis added).
(b)

"Highly Migratory Species":

While both the Senate and House bills contain similar provisions regarding international management of these species and exempt
them from U.S. fishery management, they differ in their definition of these
species. Sec. 3(15) of S. 961 defines "highly migratory species" as meaning "species of tuna," but Sec. 3(13) of H.R. 200 is more expansive and
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means "any species of fish" of migratory character "including, but not
limited to, tuna; but excluding halibut, sablefish and herring."
(c)

Fishery Rights of Foreign States:

S. 961 appears to be more restrictive than H.R. 200 in regard
to the conditions under which foreign fishing is allowed within the U.S.
fishery zone. Sec. 102(a) of S.961 confers discretionary power on the
Secretary of Commerce in deciding whether or not to allow foreign fishing. The same Section also restricts foreign fishing within the zone only
to anadromous and continental shelf fisheries. Even otherwise, foreign
fishing is to be allowed only to the extent that the U.S. cannot or will not
harvest the optimum sustainable yield. In determining the allowable catch
for foreign fishing, consideration shall be had whether and to what extent
the vessels of such nations have traditionally fished in the zone. Also S. 961
insists on a strict principle of reciprocity in allowing fishing by "any"
nation (obviously including even a traditionally fishing nation.) The bill
would not allow a foreign nation to fish within the U.S. fishery zone unless
such nation extends substantially the same fishing privileges to the vessels
of U.S.A. in that nation's fishery zones.
Sec. 201 of H.R. 200, however, appears to be more liberal
than S. 961 in that the former allows foreign fishing for all species of fish
subject to fishery management. The bill does not provide for any negotiated
agreement with foreign States regarding fishing in the zone but requires
permits to be issued to foreign nations seeking to fish in the zone. Such
a foreign nation is required to file an application giving details, inter alia,
of the nature and capacity of the vessel, its gear and processing equipment,
species and tonnage of fish to be caught and the area and period in which
fishing will be conducted, etc. The permits may be issued "after taking
into account," inter alia, any "traditional or historical patterns of fishing"
by the applicant State regarding the species of fish mentioned in the
application. However, an application for fishing by a foreign nation,
tentatively approved by the Secretary of Commerce, together with the
Statement of Conditions and Restrictions, is deemed to be an international
fisheries agreement within the meaning of Sec. 206 which requires Congressional approval.
(d)

Non-Recognition

S. 961 contains a provision for non-recognition of a claim
by a foreign nation to a fishery conservation zone beyond 12 miles off its
coast, if such a nation does not recognize the traditional fishing activity
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of the U.S. vessels in such a zone. Such non-recognition also applies in case
a foreign nation fails to recognize and accept that highly migratory species
are to be managed by applicable international fishery agreements, whether
or not such a nation is a party to any such agreement.
H.R. 200 does not contain a similar provision regarding
"non-recognition" but contains a provision for "import prohibition." Thus,
H.R. 200 prohibits import of all seafood products from any country which
violates an existing fisheries agreement or refuses to commence negotiations or fails to negotiate in good faith an agreement granting access, on
equitable terms, to U.S. fishing vessels engaged in fishing off such a
nation's coast.
(e)

Fishery Management Mechanics

S. 961 provides for the establishment of seven Regional
Fishery Management Councils which prepare plans for fishery management in their respective regions. There is also provision for the constitution of a Fishery Management Review Board to hear appeals from the
decisions of the Secretary of Commerce.
H.R. 200 seeks to set up seven similar regional management
councils.
Mexico
President Echeverria of Mexico told the General Assembly of the
United Nations that Mexico had decided to establish "an exclusive zone"
to a distance of 200 miles from its coasts. In the course of a major
policy speech, the Mexican President said that this claim implied an
affirmation of Mexican sovereignty over the "resources" of the Gulf of
California. He also stated that the claim to 200-mile "exclusive" zone did
not affect navigation, overflight or the laying of cables in the area.
Iceland
Iceland has extended its "fishery limits" to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the base-lines from which its territorial sea is measured. A
Press Release in mid-summer 1975, issued by the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs indicated that this extension was in furtherance of the policy
established by Law No. 44 of 5 April 1948, according to which all
fisheries in the continental shelf area in Iceland, should be subject to
Iceland's control. The release pointed out that the 1948 law "has been
implemented gradually in view of the progressive development of inter-

THE OCEANS

national law." It also recalled that "the Icelandic fishery limits were
extended to four miles in 1950/52, to 12 miles in 1958/61, to 50 miles
in 1972 and to 200 miles on July 15, 1975. The Press release also stated
that "the fish stocks in Iceland area can no longer sustain the effort
resulting from fishing by foreign nationals and the Icelandic fishing
fleet is capable of fully utilizing the fish stocks under scientific management." It is said, however, that Iceland would hold discussions "with
other States concerning the establishment of median lines and the application of the new rules, inter alia with regard to reciprocal rights."
Answering criticism that the Government of Iceland should have
waited for the completion of the work of the Conference on the Law of
the Sea and that, by acting as it did in extending the fishery limits
Iceland had made the work of the Conference "more difficult," the
Foreign Minister of Iceland told the General Assembly of the United
Nations on September 29, 1975 that "on the contrary, by adhering strictly
to the principles overwhelmingly supported by the Conference, my Government has emphasized its respect for the Conference and it is our conviction
that our action, as well as any similar action from other States, rather
than hinder the work of the Conference, will promote its success in the
near future." (Press Release of 15 October 1975 entitled "The Fishery
Limits off Iceland: 200 Nautical Miles" issued by the Permanent Mission
of Iceland to the United Nations, p.5)
OIL POLLUTION AND SPILLS
Oil pollution of the oceans continues to present a critical problem to
the nations of the world. A study by the Office of Technology Assessment
for the U.S. Senate 'Commerce Committee documents the magnitude of
the problem. The August, 1975 study found that the world's tanker fleet
dump about one million tons of oil a year into the oceans through normal
tanker operations, like washing oil out of the ship's cargo tanks and shifting the ballast at sea. The study went on to say that tankers spill an
additional 200,000 tons of oil every year from accidents, such as groundings and collisions. Another 250,000 tons of oil leak into coastal waters
when the tankers are drydocked, then wash out with the tides into the
sea. The United Nations has recognized the problem and has supported
a multinational effort called Integrated Global Ocean Station System,
which will endeavor to find out how much oil pollutes the ocean and
identify its source. The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is the first to initiate action on the project. NOAA
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has directed its twenty-five ships to monitor and sample oil slicks and
to identify the sources of pollution. The NOAA fleet will cover parts of
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the Gulf of Mexico and the Bering Sea.
NOAA has also contracted with the Exxon Corporation to have the Exxon
tanker fleet do the same thing along tanker routes from the Persian Gulf
to the United States and Japan, and from the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea to the oil-importing countries of Western Europe.
One might ask, once the data is collected, what means are available
to reduce oil pollution. The reader is recommended an article by Lucius
C. Caflish in 4 Annals of International Studies 213-236, 1973, Institut
Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva. A bit off the
subject but also of note, the volume contains a fine discussion of Latin
America's role in the development of the law of the sea by Ralph Zacklin
(id, 31-54.)
A United States District Court has ruled that Coast Guard negligence
caused a 100,000 gallon spill of heavy oil in Hussey Sound just outside
the Portland, Maine harbor. The spill occurred on July 22, 1972, when
the hull of the Norwegian tanker Tamaro was ripped by a submerged
ledge in the sound. The buoys maintained by the Coast Guard, and which
the Tamaro used for navigation in darkness and low tide, were off their
charted positions as much as 215 feet. The court found that, but for the
negligent maintenance of the buoys, the Tamaro would not have hit the
ledge, and held the U. S. liable for the resulting damages. The Tamaro's
owners, the Wilhelmsen Lines of Oslo, sustained damages of $3.5 million
in law suits and $500,000 expenses for repairs. It is likely the owners
will recover all or a substantial amount of the $4 million in damages.
The judge has given the parties sixty days in which to reach a settlement.
If no agreement is reached, an amount will be determined by the court
after a hearing.
The Coast Guard has identified the vessel it believes dumped 40,000
gallons of oil off the Florida Keys in July, 1975. After a four-month
search, the tanker was identified as the 42,000 ton Liberian bulker
Garbis. During the investigation, the Coast Guard inspected the logs of
247 vessels, taking oil samples from the bilges and tanks of most of
them and gathering additional samples from the oil spill. It said that
resulting tests matched two samples taken from the Garbis with three
samples taken from the ocean. The Garbis became a prime suspect when
the Coast Guard learned the vessel made a stop in Miami to purchase
a solvent of the type used to clean tanks and lines before travelling to
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New Orleans. Although the Garbis is a bulker, the Coast Guard believes
the quantity of oil indicates the Garbis was carrying oil when the incident
occurred, approximately ten or twelve miles offshore.
The Coast Guard delayed announcement of its findings until it was
sure the Garbis was back in U.S. jurisdiction. When the Garbis docked in
Philadelphia on November 7, 1975, federal marshalls arrested the master
who now faces criminal charges for failure to report the discharge, whether
accidental or not. He faces a maximum penalty of $10,000 and up to one
year imprisonment. The ship's owner, the Garbis Maritime Corporation
of London, has been cited in a civil action and faces a maximum penalty
of $5,000 plus $367,430 to cover expenses of the six week long shoreline
cleanup. This is an important case for the Coast Guard. If their matching
techniques are upheld by the court as convincing evidence, enforcement
of the U. S. pollution laws will be much easier. Before these matching
techniques were used, the Coast Guard had to meet the near impossible
burden of having a witness at each violation.
Chilean maritime authorities have revealed that in September, 1975
the Liberian merchant ship Northern Breeze ran aground off Quintero,
Chile. The impact ruptured both the compartments which were carrying
oil and the barrels containing the ship's fuel. The oil spill caused serious
contamination of the surrounding area. The negligent navigation by the
captain and two pilots was found to be the cause of the spill; they were
fined approximately $9,000.
U.S. OFFSHORE OIL DEVELOPMENT
As energy development continues to be an increasingly valuable
commodity, the push for exploration of offshore coastal and continental
shelf oil reserves grows stronger. It is unclear which of the competing
forces, the energy movement or the environmental concerns, will have
the controlling voice in the conflict. The Ford Administration, however,
has recently decided to move ahead with the sale of more than a million
acres in oil leases off the California coast.
Present guidelines controlling offshore leasing policies are found in
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953. The Act has remained
virtually unchanged in twenty-two years, leading to what some opponents
say are conditions favoring the oil industry above all other concerns,
since the initial legislation was principally drafted by the oil companies.
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A bill (S.521) which attempts to correct some of the inequities has just
recently passed the Senate and is on its way to the House of Representatives.
The White House stance is certain to create controversy between
the Federal Government and the States. The California State Coastal Zone
Conservation 'Commission has announced plans to keep a tight rein on
future offshore oil development. Generally, the states have jurisdictional
authority over the coastal area as defined by the Submerged Lands Act,
while the Federal waters extend beyond those limits. California has been
attempting a unified approach to offshore development, and currently
sees the traditional piecemeal approach as wholly inadequate to meet
the state's environmental and ecological needs. It is anticipated that
should the Federal government, through the Department of the Interior,
go ahead with its proposed oil lease sales, various state agencies (particularly in California) will commence litigation for the purpose of delaying the sale until many heretofore unresolved environmental and economic
questions are given further study. California hopes to be able to work
with the Federal government in order to formulate policies to protect
the coastal area of the state. It is the contention of the coastal states
that the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management has
failed to consider adequately the environmental impact of offshore development, and that the Department has failed to make its development
plans consistent with state programs for protection of the coastal zone.
And, in the East Coast of the United States nine oil companies have asked
the Department of the Interior to lease 4.4 million acres for oil exploration off the Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina coasts. The proposed
lease sale is part of a program to accelerate exploration of the "virgin"
areas of the United States' outer continental shelf. These areas are deemed
to be the principal hope for discovering large new reserves of domestic
oil and gas. Early in 1976, after a series of public hearings and environmental impact statements, Secretary of the Interior Thomas Kleppe will
decide whether to hold the sale.
All is not well on the offshore oil development, however. Gulf Oil
Corporation recently announced the end of a series of unsuccessful oil
hunts in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Florida. More than thirty
oil companies paid the Federal government $1.49 billion in 1973 for
leasing and drilling rights on more than 500,000 acres in the Gulf off
the coast of Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. Gulf's failure to find any
commercial quantities of oil and gas was the fifteenth consecutive dry
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hole drilled off the Florida coast in sixteen months, constituting what
the industry refers to as the worst disappointment in twenty years of
Federal leasing in the Gulf.
COASTAL REGULATION
An increasingly important concern to the coastal states is that of
protecting their shorelines and coastal areas in order to preserve their
resources and beauty. Haphazard, destructive, and unsightly development
along the coast, coupled with what some consider blatant disregard for
the coast by the construction of hazardous installations on the continental
shelf, have led some states, most notably California, to implement extensive
coastal regulations.
In what may become a model for future planning, California is
pioneering an experiment involving massive control of future development
in a zone five miles wide along the entire state coastline. The objective
of this plan is to preserve the coast in its present condition and to improve
it as a prime state and national resource. Federal government officials
say it is the most comprehensive program yet to emerge from the welter
of planning by coastal states.
In attempting to recapture some of its authority over coastal land
use, California's focus is on the concentration of development in developed
areas, preservation of agricultural land and wetlands, and prohibition of
development likely to harm the coastal zone. It is the type of decisive
action that many coastal states and nations feel is necessary in order to
adequately enhance and protect valuable resources.
MERCHANT SHIPPING
In its first year of operation, the Puerto Rican government is calling
its shipping monopoly a success. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority
(PRMSA), the agency created to run the government line, petitioned the
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) for a 15% rate increase, citing
the general inflationary spiral. The FMC approved the increase, effective
September 21, 1975. The acquisition and consolidation of the three major
private lines is still stirring up controversy within the island community.
While some see this acquisition as the first in a series of encroachments
on private enterprise, which will undermine investor confidence in Puerto
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Rico, advocates of the move cite figures of greater efficiency and practicality in the island's transportation lifeline. Projected savings for the period
ending September 1976 could reach $36 million.
Nearby, Cuba is rapidly expanding her merchant marine in order
to gain greater independence from foreign companies. In the years since
Castro came to power, its merchant fleet has increased nine-fold. In 1975
the fleet is expected to reach 670,000 tons, making it the fourth largest in
Latin America. This projection does not include the fishing fleet, which
has increased seven-fold since 1959. Official sources plan for a doubling
of the merchant marine capacity by 1980. Orders for thirty-five new
ships have already been placed with two countries; Japan recently built
Cuba's largest ship, a 27,000 ton bulk carrier. Dependence on foreign
shipping will be lessened further by Cuban membership in the new multinational Caribbean Shipping Corporation (NAMUCAR).
The final administrative step to place NAMUCAR in operation was
taken in San Jose, Costa Rica the first week of December, 1975. Mexico,
Cuba, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Jamaica paid up full mem.
berships; Colombia and Panama are expected to do so in the immediate
future. The present timetable calls for NAMUCAR to become operational
in the first quarter, 1976.
FISHERIES
The struggle over protection of marine mammals continues to grow.
The U.S. Marine Mammals Protection Act, passed in 1972, is getting
its first test. According to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),
criminal charges have been filed against two men who allegedly captured
twenty-one dolphins in Bahamian waters and sold them for a profit to
European and Canadian tourist attractions. Investigators claim that the
catch included a nursing female and infant. While the Act is getting its
first major legal test, progress within the tuna industry to minimize the
slaughter of porpoise has been slow. The drowning of more than 100,000
porpoises a year is incidental to the taking of an important food-fish,
the yellow-fin tuna. The NMFS has promulgated its regulations for the
1976 tuna season, which promises a 30% reduction in porpoise mortalities
over 1975 (presently estimated at 130,000). Alternate proposals, including
absolute quotas and ceilings and 100% observer programs, which were
strongly opposed by the tuna industry, will not be established.
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The National Whale Symposium, held during the summer, discussed
various topics concerning whales. There is growing grass-roots concern
in -the United States over the slaughter of countless whales by the Soviets
and Japanese. Talks among the concerned nations have brought no firm
response from the whale-killers. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has drawn
the ire of Peru, which is closely watching the activities of a Soviet whaling
factory off the Peruvian coast.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Cayman Trough to be Explored
The U.S. Navy, the National Science Foundation, and the National
Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration are funding a large-scale exploration of the Cayman Trough in the northwestern Caribbean Sea. Scientists
hope to find evidence concerning the theory that the Cayman Trough
marks the boundary between the North American Geologic Plate and the
Caribbean Geologic Plate.
The project is to be carried out in three steps. In November, 1975,
the Navy survey ship Wyman was scheduled to begin high precision
mapping of the Trough from the surface.
The plan next calls for three Woods Hole Oceanographic Research
Ships to begin exploration in the early part of 1976. These ships include
the Alvin, a deep diving submersible. The Alvin is to carry a pilot and
two scientists into the Trough in order to map it in more detail and to
collect rock samples. The Alvin's dives, which will last from seven to nine
hours each, are projected for three two-week periods.
The technology of the mapping will be highly sophisticated. The surface sonar system to be used continuously records ninety simultaneous
echo soundings across a band of sea floor that, at typical operating depths,
is two miles wide. The sonar system will be coordinated with a navigation
system to adjust the soundings for wave action. This adjustment for the
pitch and roll of the ship will result in a much more precise map of the
Trough. In addition, the Alvin's position will be charted by an automatic
logging system relative to a network of electronic buoys placed on the sea
floor.
The Alvin is self-propelled but has a limited range of a few miles and
can only descend 12,000 feet of the Trough's 22,000 feet. The researchers
hope the Navy's bathyscaphe Trieste will join the project as the third step.

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

The Trieste has the capability of reaching the bottom of the Trough, yet
its maneuverability is limited. This is one reason why the mapping must
be as precise as possible.
Other projects scheduled for the Trieste in the near future are a dive
into the Middle American Trench, off the west coast of Mexico; exploration of the Blake Plateau off Florida and the nearby sea floor; and the
exploration of the Puerto Rico Trench.
Research Improves Fish Production
Global research has given preliminary indications of greater quantities of fish production and yield through various means of scientific development. In wide-ranging experiments, an annual yield of more than nine
tons of fish per acre has been achieved in experimental ponds. And, up to
6,000 tons of salmon can be derived from one acre of hatchery by
releasing them to the sea, and later recapturing the fish. Concern about
general world food problems has led many research teams to look toward
the ocean for more and more sources of protein and nutrient supply. A
research group at the University of Wisconsin has used chemicals to lead
salmon back to a desired location. It has been found that early in development, some fish, especially salmon and chinook, learn the smell of their
native river. Having been thus affected, in later life they can pick up at
sea the scent of the stream of their birth and return there in order to
spawn. Experiments have succeeded in exposing fish with no previous
odor-experience to a chemical odor, and through the use of such substances to enhance their return. The experiments have been very successful
in increasing recovery of the fish. Scientists have formulated methods to
decrease the maturing time of certain fish species, thus accelerating their
production. It is anticipated that if research in this field continues to be
as successful as in the past, it will be possible to double the world yield
of certain kinds of fish.
Underwater Medical Conjerence
The Second International Physician's Underwater Medicine Program
is scheduled to be held January 10-18, 1976 in Curagao and Bonaire in
the Netherlands Antilles. Recognizing the need for greater medical awareness of the problems connected with underwater diving, interested physicians are to attend a series of lectures on advanced diving physiology and
medicine.
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OCEAN LAW CENTER
A Center for Oceans Law and Policy has been created at the University of Virginia to develop a range of teaching, research, and conference
programs focusing on the formulation of national and international policy
for the oceans. Its Director, John Norton Moore, is presently Deputy
Special Representative of the President for the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea and Chairman of the National Security
Council Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea, on leave from the
faculty of the University of Virginia School of Law. He expects to continue on a full-time basis with the Department of State until the conclusion
of the current negotiations. The Center is being funded by an initial grant
from the Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation, Inc., of
New York City. Arrangements are under way for the Center to be permanently endowed and to occupy office and research facilities in a new
addition to the present Law School building. The Center began preliminary operations on July 1, 1975. Opening ceremonies were held on
November 22 in connection with the first meeting of the Center's twentynine member Advisory Board.

EDITOR'S NOTE (1) : The following comment on the Law of the
Sea Conference (New York, March, 1976) was received after
the report on The Oceans had been prepared. It was submitted
by The Honorable Thomas A. Clingan, formerly Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Ocean Affairs, who has resumed his teaching duties at the University of Miami School of Law.

As the third substantive session of the United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference approaches, the nations involved are conducting a serious and
thorough evaluation of the main work product of the Geneva session held
in the Spring, 1975. That product was a document entitled the "Informal
Single Negotiating Text." At its 55th plenary meeting, the Conference
decided to request each chairman of the three main Committees to prepare
a single negotiating text covering the subjects entrusted to his Committee.
The resulting text presumably takes into account all of the formal and
informal discussions conducted within the framework of each committee,
or in any way related to it. The text is designed not to prejudice the
position of any delegation, and does not represent a negotiated text or
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accepted compromise. What it does is to provide a useful basis for future
negotiation, eliminating extreme positions, and reducing the areas of disagreement to a point where the negotiations should be more manageable
in the future.
The question facing the Conference as it reopens in New York in
the Spring, 1976 is whether this single Negotiating Text has sufficiently
widespread acceptance to be the basis for future negotiations or whether,
on the other hand, it is too divergent from too many national attitudes,
and thus unacceptable for such use. The will to negotiate a successful
treaty will be reflected in the choice that is made. Should the text be
supported for its intended purpose, the Conference will appear to have
taken a major step toward a successful conclusion. If, on the other hand,
the document is rejected out of hand, then the risk will be high that
nations will return to the rigidity of national positions, and the Conference
leadership will be hard-pressed to generate new ideas for holding the Conference together and moving it steadfastly toward a successful conclusion.
What if the Conference "fails"? Two things should be kept in mind.
First, failure of the Conference in terms of the inability to write a
treaty may have consequences for international law far more serious than
the mere inability to agree on new substance for the law of the sea. The
nations of the world have embarked on a major effort toward structuring
a new world order for the oceans--an effort which if successful may
carry with it major implications on how international law is made. Clearly,
that task was undertaken with the widespread belief that it would be
successful. If it is not, there is bound to be widespread gloom among the
legal philosophers and fundamentalists concerning whether international
law will ever break out of the rudimentary mold it has found itself in
since the 16th century.
Second, no matter what happens now it may truly be asked whether
the Conference did in fact "fail" in its totality. So many attitudes have
been realigned and so many old concepts laid to rest that it is probably
impossible that the world could ever return to concepts of ocean usage
irrevocably changed. Thus, even if there were to be no substantial, widespread agreement on a law of the sea package by the natural termination
of the Conference, it is clear that the Conference would have left an indelible mark upon the law of the oceans. That mark would then have to be
given legitimacy through some other method of institutionalization: through
bilateral or regional arrangements, or by the painful and time-consuming
generation of new rules of customary international law.
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In a substantive sense, the Conference has come a long way. Broad
consensus seems to be emerging on the creation of exclusive economic
zones adjacent to coastal States, extending as far as 200 miles from the
baselines from which the territorial sea is measured, for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting the natural resources, and perhaps for other
purposes as well. Similarly, it seems that the world is ready to accept a
twelve mile limit to the territorial sea as a part of an overall, acceptable
arrangement for the oceans. Progress seems to be apparent in the negotiations regarding marine pollution. The choices with regard to the conduct
of marine scientific research, and their consequences, are more clearly
understood. Navigational issues have been carefully worked out almost to
conclusion. Many of the fisheries problems are resolved to the point of
final polishing, although questions regarding special treatment for certain
species based upon their spawning or migratory habits still remain. One
of the areas requiring the most work is the international seabed area.
There is work yet to be done in defining both the type of legal regime
that should pertain beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and the
machinery for implementing it. It is on these issues that there are still
wide differences which must be negotiated out.
A final comment upon the substance: the treaty cannot be complete
without a full resolution of the problems remaining with regard to the
question of compulsory dispute settlement. Clearly, a major treaty of this
nature deserves and requires some mechanism for the definition of its
terms and the resolution of disputes.
While it is relatively clear that the detailed work yet to be done
effectively prevents the conclusion of the Conference by the end of this
Spring session, it is equally clear that a treaty, if it is to be seen at all,
will emerge within a finite period of time. If the delegations to New York
could agree on a second 1976 session, then conclusions of the issues in
principle is possible by the end of that year. While this would indeed be
an optimistic target, it is not an impossible one, and is one which all
delegates should labor diligently to achieve.
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EDITOR'S NOTE (2): The following, dated January 15, 1976 and sponsored by the American Society of International Law and the Ford Foundation, was also received after the report on The Oceans had been prepared.
It is the third report of the Subcommittee on International Law and
Relations of the Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea. The Committee, established in 1972, is composed of private citizens appointed by
the Chairman of the National Security Council Interagency Task Force
on the Law of the Sea to "provide adequate representation of the diverse
interests involved in the law of the sea." Members of the Committee serve
solely in an advisory capacity and the views stated herein do not necessarily represent those of the United States Government. A list of the members
of the Committee is found at the end of the report.

THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE:
THE CURRENT STATUS AND THE
"INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT"
INTRODUCTION. This is the third report of the Subcommittee on
International Law and Relations (Subcommittee) made pursuant to a
Ford Foundation grant to the American Society of International Law.
The grant supports activities of the Subcommittee with respect to the international law of the sea negotiations and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Conference). The first report consisted of
recommendations for research prior to the first substantive session of the
Conference. The second report consisted of an account and analysis of the
proceedings at the Caracas session of the Conference together with recommendations for intersessional research.
The present report contains a brief introduction setting forth salient
data concerning the Geneva session of the Conference, a general discussion of the organizational and procedural aspects of the session, and an
analysis of the outcome with particular reference to the "Informal Single
Negotiating Text." It concludes with some recommendations for further
intersessional research.
I.

GENERAL INFORMATION.

The third (second substantive) session of the Conference was held
in Geneva, Switzerland, from March 17 to May 10, 1975. The session
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continued the substantive work begun at the Caracas meeting held from
June 20-August 29, 1974. Approximately 140 states participated in the
Geneva session. No treaty or treaties dealing with the law of the sea were
adopted, however, and in concluding its work the Conference decided to
recommend to the General Assembly that a third substantive session be
held in New York City from March 29-May 21, 1976, and that the Conference be empowered to then decide whether an additional session will
be needed during the summer of 1976.
II.

PROCEDURE.

Most observers of the Geneva session perceived a greater willingness
on the part of most delegates to seriously negotiate and seek compromise
solutions. This compared favorably with the rhetorical "position taking"
atmosphere which prevailed during the Caracas session. Nonetheless, it
was apparent from an early date that it would not be possible to secure
the desired treaty during the Geneva session and, indeed, that a target
date of late 1976 was as optimistic an outlook as could be found.
There was very limited use at the Geneva session of formal meetings
of the Conference or its main committees, and greatly more use was made
of working sessions of the main committees and private group meetings
such as those of the "Evensen Group," chaired by Mr. Jens Evensen of
Norway. The pattern during the early weeks of the session was one of
committee or informal group meetings in the morning with afternoons
devoted to meetings of informal specialized interest or negotiating groups.
There was, in fact, a plethora of such informal groups which, though
producing a more practical negotiating atmosphere, created in the case
of the Evensen Group some resentment on the part of a few delegations
not invited to participate. A table of formal and informal groups active
at Geneva, prepared by Ann L. Hollick, is appended to this paper as
Annex A.
The negotiations proceeded quite slowly during the first half of the
session and, in an attempt to accelerate the process of reaching agreement,
Conference President Amerasinghe proposed at one point that negotiations
take place in consultative groups based on regional representation. That
proposal was rejected, however, and thereafter the existing procedures and
organizations were continued. A second proposal by Amerasinghe met
with Conference approval. He asked that the chairman and officers of
each of the three main committees prepare a single unified negotiating
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text to serve as the basis for future negotiating or voting efforts, such
texts to take account of the work of the formal and informal groups of
the Conference. It was expressly understood that such texts were not to be
binding on the delegations, but would provide a single text from which
negotiations could further progress.
III.

OUTCOME OF THE GENEVA SESSION
A.

Substance o/ the Informal Text

As a result of the acceptance of Amerasinghe's second proposal, the
Geneva session of the Conference produced the "Informal Single Negotiating Text. ' 2 The Informal Text consists of three main parts, each being
a draft prepared by the chairman of one of the three main committees
and dealing with the subject allocated to that committee. In addition
there is a draft of articles dealing with compulsory dispute settlement.
It was commonly understood that the Committee I text was largely
the work of the chairman of the working group, Christopher Pinto of Sri
Lanka, who had been endeavoring to establish a common ground between
developing and developed nations by the use of a compromise approach in
the "Pinto Paper." The Committee Chairman, Paul Engo of Cameroon,
however, extensively rewrote the Pinto draft with the result that it leans
far more toward the Group of 77 position than had earlier Pinto drafts.
It consists of seventy-five articles dealing with general principles, the seabed authority and its machinery, and questions of finance. The Annex on
basic conditions of exploration and exploitation was prepared by Pinto
and transmitted by his working group to the main committee. Committee
I seems to be the only Conference committee in which agreement is still
not within reach. By the end of the session it was clear that there was a
mutual distrust between the developed and the developing nations regarding one another's proposals for the operating of the seabed authority and
little likelihood of a common meeting ground. The developing countries
wish to see the seabed authority as an "Enterprise" controlled by them
with the power to discriminate in their favor and to independently develop
seabed resources which would be "banked" during the initial years in
which mining operations would be conducted by the developed nations.
The developed powers, in turn, were distrustful of the fairness with which
1

See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.54 (18 April 1975) at 3.
2U.N. Docs. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Parts I, II, and III (6 and 7 May 1975); and
SD.Gp/2d Session/No. 1/Rev. 5 (1 May 1975).
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such an "Enterprise" would be operated and feared, quite logically, that
it could result in an OPEC-like cartel. The issues here are ideological
and are connected closely with the drive of the developing countries for
a "new economic order" in which the wealth of the developed countries
would be redistributed. The powers and structure of the international seabed authority and the methods to be used for the exploitation of the
manganese nodules have thus become enmeshed in a larger dispute about
a "just" division of the world's economic resources.
The text presented by Galindo Pohl of El Salvador, Chairman of
Committee II, consists of 137 articles and covers the territorial sea and
contiguous zone, straits used for international navigation, the exclusive
economic zone, the continental shelf, high seas, land-locked states, archipelagos, regime of islands, enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, territories
under foreign occupation or colonial domination, and settlement of disputes. The basis for this text included a lengthy working paper with alternative articles as well as documents produced by the Evensen Group, the
Group of 77, and functional negotiating groups. The text represents a
compromise acceptable to some nations insofar as the major principles
are concerned, but there are a number of inconsistencies and purely
drafting matters which will need to be dealt with in subsequent negotiating sessions. There are also some points about the draft which should raise
serious concern among United States Government negotiators (some of
these questions are identified in Annex B, prepared by Lewis M.
Alexander).
The text for Committee III was the product of the Committee Chairman Alexander Yankov of Bulgaria, his bureau, and the heads of the
working groups on scientific research (Colonel Metternich of West Germany) and pollution (Jos6 Luis Vallarta of Mexico). It consists of fortyfour articles on the marine environment, thirty-seven articles on marine
scientific research, and eleven articles on development and transfer of
technology. Included in the text are several articles that were actually
negotiated in the respective working groups. The working group on pollution produced negotiated articles on monitoring, environmental assessment, standards for land-based sources (with alternative formulations
concerning double standards), and pollution from dumping of wastes at
sea. The working group on science and transfer of technology issued possible consolidated texts, including some alternative provisions, on the
conduct and promotion of marine scientific research, the legal status of
installations for marine scientific research, and responsibility and liability.
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As a result of some confusion concerning the respective jurisdiction of
Committees II and III over pollution from ships in the economic zone,
further negotiations will be needed on that subject, and the Evensen
Group is likely to consider the matter at its planned intersessional
meeting.
The provisions on compulsory settlement of disputes contain four
introductory articles followed by two main annexes. Although an attempt
was made to arrive at one single negotiating text, various difficulties were
encountered resulting in a compromise which proved acceptable to a vast
majority of the participating delegations, namely that any contracting
party, when ratifying the Convention may choose one of three methods of
settlement-arbitration, law of the sea tribunal, or the International
Court of Justice. Consequently, when a case is brought against a contracting party it has to be brought before the forum chosen by that party.
This solution has the advantage of allowing greater flexibility in the
choice of the forum by a particular State; it avoids the imposition on all
States of one single method; and it thus provides more respect for the
sovereign right of a State to choose the weapon with which it wants to
fight its legal battles. Nevertheless, this solution was objected to by delegations which thought that the method they preferred-for instance the
International Court of Justice-was so much better than the others that it
should be universal. Objections were raised also by those who did not
really like the idea of having to accept any procedure leading to a binding
decision. Others-the so-called "functionalists"-were willing to accept
the idea of binding decision-making for only a few selected areas (e.g.,
seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, or fisheries, or scientific research, or pollution), but were opposed to it for the remainder of
the Convention. A third group, while accepting binding decision-making
in principle, argued that in areas under national jurisdiction (internal
waters, territorial sea, continental shelf, and economic zone) only national
courts should have jurisdiction, except where some important international
rights (such as freedom of navigation) were concerned.
B.

Status of the Informal Text

The political and legal implications of the Informal Text are important. In his report on the Geneva session made to the Commission to
Study the Organization of Peace, Prof. Louis B. Sohn observed that:
While the four parts of the text are supposed to represent
only the opinions of the chairmen of the various committees who
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prepared them, they are in fact based largely on drafts prepared
by various working groups and reflect a large measure of consensus. Nevertheless, these texts are not considered "negotiated"
or compromise texts, and are merely intended to serve as a basis
for the next session of the Conference. .. .Delegations are free
to propose further amendments but have been requested to work
jointly on them and to prepare composite proposals rather than
a mass of unrelated amendments.
Further indication of the political and legal status of the informal
texts was given when representatives of the United States Government
appeared before Congressional Committees to report on the progress of
the negotiations at Geneva. In testimony before the Subcommittee on
Fisheries and Wildlife of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries on May 19, 1975, Professor John Norton Moore, Chairman of
the National Security Council's Inter-Agency Law of the Sea Task Force,
stated:
Although the single text is not a fully negotiated or consensus document, it is in important respects, at least in regard to
Committees II and III, an indication of an overall package necessary for a satisfactory treaty. . . . Even though it is not a
negotiated or consensus text, the preparation of the single text
is a significant and necessary step toward a treaty. For the first
time, the Conference will be able to focus on a specific text
rather than a multitude of alternatives and national proposals
• ..I believe that for the most part, at least for the work of
Committees II and III, it also reflects a widely shared view about
the nature of the overall package in a manner conducive to the
achievement of a realistic and widely acceptable Treaty.
At that same hearing, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Clingan, of the Office of Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, Department of State,
observed that:
The single negotiating text must be viewed as a procedural
device providing the basis for further negotiations, and is not a
negotiated text or an agreed compromise. It does not affect any
nation's national position. . . .Its roots are in the negotiations,
and it is not to be seen as arbitrary or without substance. In
some areas it reflects shared views.
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According to these observations it is fair to conclude that the Informal Text is not binding and has no legal effect. As far as the United
States is concerned, Part II does nonetheless reflect essentially what
an
acceptable ultimate agreement would look like on the subjects with which
it deals. Part III also appears to be a negotiated product and, with
some
modification, may be acceptable to the United States on the subjects
with
which it deals. Part I is essentially the negotiating position of the Group
of 77, the text not reflecting any consensus or compromise at this stage.
Acceptability of provisions by various nations or groups of nations
aside, the Informal Text does represent a watershed development in
the
negotiations since for the first time delegates will have a single provision
on each issue to use as the basis for further negotiations. Such "first
drafts" or "reports," with regard to any negotiation or subject, often
tend to take on a life of their own-that is, they strongly affect and
direct negotiations from that point forward, carrying almost a presumption
of agreement unless strong objections are voiced, as they have in the
case
of the Committee I text. Major effort tends to be turned in such situations
to fine points of drafting, reconciling conflicting provisions, and to
consideration of interpretation of language. It becomes progressively
more
difficult, as such single texts remain the basis for negotiation, to
make
major alterations in the substance of significant provisions.
Negotiations on the Informal Text will probably first revolve about
attempts by some nations to make major changes in articles or texts
with
which they are fundamentally dissatisfied. This approach can be expected,
for example, on the part of developed nations with respect to the
Committee I text, although it does not seem likely that major alterations
will
be attempted with respect to the Committee II and IH1 texts.
Even if no written agreement is derived from future negotiations,
the Informal Text could still play a profound role in the development
of
customary international law. The portions that have been highly negotiated
probably reflect the expectations of most nations and they will tend
to
conform, in state practice, to the principles set forth in the document.
Where there is philosophical divergence, as is the case with the Committee
I text, likely national actions can -he also expected to follow on from
the
text - developing nations seeking total control of seabed mining activities,
developed nations opposing that approach and authorizing their nationals
to engage in such mining activities. Thus, whether the Conference produces
a desired treaty or not, the Informal Text may in one sense or another
provide a reliable indicator of the future direction of the law of the
sea.

THE OCEANS

IV.

SUBJECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

As has been done in both earlier reports of the Subcommittee, recommendations for possible further research are set forth in this section.
Although such recommendations have in the past dealt with quite specific
substantive matters, most of those set forth below deal with procedural
matters or assessment of values involved in the negotiations.
1. Has the Conference already served its most useful purposes:
clarification of issues, communication of positions on the issues, and an
understanding of the linkages among the various issues? In the present
context, is unilateral or coordinated multilateral action desirable?
In addressing these questions the alternatives should not be viewed
too starkly-to continue with the Conference or walk out of it-but should
rather be seen in terms of the various national interests involved on a
topic by topic basis. To what extent, for example, has the Conference
already become part of an on-going customary law-making process? Does
it succeed only if it produces a widely accepted and comprehensive law
of the sea treaty or are there other values which can be derived from its
continuation? How would unilateral or coordinated multilateral action
(particularly 200-mile fishing zones and deep seabed mining authorizations) affect the ability of the Conference to achieve its express objective
or alternatives thereto?
2. Which nations' interests would be better served by the adoption
of a compromise treaty and which by the development of the law of the
sea through customary international law?
Though involving some difficult matters of judgment, such a study
would prove extremely enlightening both in assessing the attitudes of
particular nations toward the Conference and in judging what future
courses of action they might take in the event of a Conference failure. Obviously, such an inquiry would have to be made on a subject by subject
basis, though the overall impact of one format over the other should be considered. Such a study would require an identification of interests to be analyzed; differentiation between short, medium, and long term interests;
differentiation between narrow, parochial interests and broader interests
in world order; likely possible outcomes of the Conference in terms of
substantive agreement; and likely scenarios in the event of non-agreement.
It would probably be most practical if a quite limited number of key
states or groups of states were selected for analysis.
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3. What is likely to be the ultimate impact of the philosophical debate on the seabed mining question (Committee I) and
how might this
apparent impasse be resolved?
Several sub-issues should be addressed in such a study:
(1) how pervasive are external influences on the Conference negotiations;
(2) specifically, is the question of a seabed mining regime more
linked to the
question of cartelization of raw materials or to other
law of the sea
issues; (3) would it be practicable to sever the seabed
question from the
negotiations; and (4) what would be the relative advantages
and disadvantages of approving a treaty based on Parts II and
III of the Informal Text, sending Part I back to a revived Seabed Committee
of more
limited composition.
4.

What is the value of the Informal Text?
As noted in this report, such documents tend to take a
"life of their
own," but the implications of that "life" are uncertain.
This issue should
be examined both from the standpoint of the Text as leading
to accepted
written agreement and as affecting customary law development
in the
event of a Conference failure.
5. From a United States point of view, are the detailed provisions
of
the Informal Text acceptable, as they presently stand?
What modifications, if any, would be required to reach that stage of
acceptability?
In considering this issue, attention should not only be focused
on an
article-by-article assessment, but also on general negotiating
tactics; that
is, what articles might be improved from the United States
point of view
in terms of sacrifices on other articles. More broadly, which
packages of
articles might be improved at the expense of other interests?
Although it
might extend the scope of such an inquiry too far, it would
nonetheless
be useful to discuss external bargaining elements in such
an analysis.
ANNEX A
GROUPS AT LOS-3
(Compiled by Ann L. Hollick)
I.

Official Conference Groups
Conference (Bureau) General Committee (48 members)
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Committee I (Bureau) Working Group (of 50)-Chairman's private consultative groups
Committee II (Bureau) Informal consultative groups (all members-with working groups of smaller sizes for some issues):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Baselines Working Group
Historic Bays and Historic Waters Working Group
Contiguous Zone Working Group
Innocent Passage Working Group
High Seas Working Group
Land-locked and Geographically Disadvantaged Working Group on Access to the sea (8 transit and 5 landlocked)
Continental Shelf
Exclusive Economic Zone
Straits
Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas
Islands
Delimitation

Committee III (Bureau) two working groups-Chairman's private
drafting and negotiating groups
Credentials Committee
Drafting Committee
II.

Semi-official Negotiation Groups
Dispute Settlement Group
Juridical Experts (Evensen Group consisting of heads of delegations)

III. Ad Hoc or Miscellaneous Issue-oriented Groups
Group of 17-pollution
Group of 5-security and transit
Group of 13-science
Amorphous Group-science
Honduras Group on Continental Shelf
UK/Fiji Group on Straits
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IV.

Regional Groups
African Group-Ivory Coast chairman
Latin American Group-Contacts to Committee I (Rattray) and II
(Ajala)
1. Caribbean States
2. Central American States
Asian-Asian group of Group of 77
Arab-separate meetings on each committee
WEO
European Economic Community
East European

V. Interest Groups
Group of 77 (Bureau) Kedadi chairman
Committee I-Working Group ('Bureau) Contact Group
Committee II-Contact Group (Njenga chairman)
Committee III-Working Group-Contact Group Iraq chairman
Archipelagic States
Oceanic States
Land-locked and Geographically Disadvantaged-48 members (Turkey chairman)
Committee I Working Group (Czechoslovakia chairman)
Committee II-Contact Group questions of Transit
Working Group on Marine Scientific Research (Netherlands chairman)
Land-locked states of Group of 77
Straits States
Territorialist Group
Coastal States (transformed into Evensen Group)
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VI.

Luncheon Clubs
Dredge and Drill
Fishhook
Defense Lunch
Science Club Lunch
ANNEX B

SOME CRITICISMS OF PART II OF THE INFORMAL SINGLE
NEGOTIATING TEXT IN TERMS OF UNITED STATES
OCEAN INTERESTS
(Compiled by Lewis M. Alexander)
1. There is a provision for a contiguous zone beyond territorial
limits, up to 24 miles from shore. The U.S. has opposed such a zone on
the grounds that it might be taken as a security zone. There is no mention of the zone as a security zone in the text.
2. Within straits used for international navigation there is provi.
sion for straits States regulating certain aspects of transit passage.
3. Mention is made in the straits articles of their connecting "high
seas or an exclusive economic zone." The U.S. is pressing hard for the
status of the extra-territorial waters of the economic zone to be that of
high seas.
4. Within the exclusive economic zone, coastal State jurisdiction
would extend over scientific research and pollution control and abatement.
This is partially negated by provisions in Part III, but it is in Part II.
5. The provisions for internationalization of highly migratory species within the economic zone are extremely weak. Also, whales and porpoises are included in the list of highly-migratory species to be regulated
by regional organizations.
6. There are no specifics for fixing the outer edge of the continental
margin.
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7. There is no mention of a boundary review commission to pass on
the suitability of a coastal State's designation of its outer seabed limits,
nor is there mention of the permanence of boundaries once fixed or of
integrity of foreign investment in seabed resources beyond the economic
zone.
8. The International Authority is given the right to determine rates
of contribution by developing countries from seabed resource exploitation
beyond the economic zone.
9. On archipelagos there was no decision on the percentage of baselines which could be greater than 80 nautical miles in length, nor on the
breadth of the sealanes; and the definition of an atoll is a poor one. By
this definition the Bahamas are not an archipelago, since their land/water
ratio is greater than 1:1.
10. Under "Islands" there is a provision that rocks which cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or territorial sea. The U.K. would probably refuse
to ratify such a treaty.
11. Part II retains the reference both to "enclosed" and "semienclosed" seas, without distinguishing between them. It also retains the
requirement that they be connected with the ocean by a narrow outlet,
thereby ruling out a number of otherwise bona fide semi-enclosed seas
(e.g., the North Sea and the Gulf of Thailand).
12. The provisions for boundary delimitation between opposite or
adjacent continental shelves or economic zones are a step backward from
the 1958 Convention in that they make no specific reference to special
circumstance situations.
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